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Over the period since 1970, Britain has improved its relative productivity perfor-
mance, but there remains a signiﬁcant gap in market sector productivity between
Britain and both Continental Europe and the United States. Much of the gap
between Britain and Continental Europe is due to lower levels of capital intensity
and skill. However, even taking these into account, there remains a signiﬁcant gap
between Britain and the United States. This reﬂects not just a weakness in high
tech areas but an inability to absorb best-practice techniques and methods in wide
swathes of the market sector. Part of this is due to a weakness in technological
innovation despite a high quality science base. This includes comparatively low
and falling levels of R&D and patenting as well as a distinct lag in the diﬀusion
of innovations relative to other countries.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Britain was widely known as the “sick man of Europe”. Why?
During the European Golden Age, which stretched from the post World War II
recovery to the ﬁrst oil shock in 1973, Britain had been overtaken by the major
countries of Continental Europe in terms of GDP per capita despite having been
far ahead in 1950. Furthermore both unemployment and inﬂation had been rising
steadily since the mid-1960s. Then, on top of this, the ﬁrst oil shock itself was
a disaster. By the end of 1974, unemployment was rising rapidly, inﬂation was
heading towards 25 percent and the stock market had fallen in real terms to its
level in 1920.
Performance continued to be relatively weak until the early to mid-1980s since
when there has been some catch up with Continental Europe in terms of GDP
per capita, unemployment has fallen substantially and inﬂation has stabilised at
a relatively low level. Nevertheless, even today there is a signiﬁcant productivity
gap, with business sector productivity (output per hour worked) probably around
20 percent below that in France and Germany, and 30 percent below the United
States.
So where does technological innovation ﬁt into this story? Technological inno-
vation across the world is one of the driving forces behind productivity advance.
However, it is hard to argue that technological innovation, or the lack of it, in
Britain is an important factor in explaining the vicissitudes of the last ﬁfty years.
The unemployment/inﬂation story has only the most tenuous connection with
technological advance. Even the large ﬂuctuations in productivity and GDP per
capita relative to other countries have less to do with technological innovation, per
se, and more to do with the extent to which UK companies utilise best practice
methods. These are, of course, intimately related to technology but the fundamen-
tal problem is more organisational than technological.1 And the basic questions
concern the incentives to utilise best practice methods and the barriers against
doing so. These are, of course, big issues2 which we only discuss tangentially in
what follows. Here, we shall focus on the role of technological innovation although
this will, inevitably, lead us to touch on how innovations are used.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2, we provide a
1The matched plant studies carried out in the 1980s and 1990s by the National Institute of
Social and Economic Research bring this home vividly (see Steedman and Wagner, 1987, for
example).
2McKinsey (1998) presents a comprehensive analysis of these questions.
3picture of the economic performance of the UK over the past three decades, the
main focus being on productivity. This is followed in Section 3 by a detailed review
of technological innovation in the UK over the same period. The overall picture
reveals that after a long period of falling behind, UK productivity performance
over the last twenty years has been relatively good with some degree of catch-up
on the major competitor countries. However there remains a productivity gap.
With regard to technological innovation, the UK performance in basic science has
been good but the innovation performance in the market sector is weak.
In the light of these overarching facts, in Section 4 we discuss various aspects
of the environment in which UK companies operate in order to shed some light on
their productivity and innovation performance. Then, in the concluding section,
we set out our understanding of what has been happening with regard to techno-
logical innovation in Britain. Our basic story is one of a weakness in the UK in
the commercial application of technological innovations despite the high quality
science base. Major reasons for this are poor educational standards outside the
top third of the ability range, lack of (and low valuation of) general management
skills and low levels of product market competition in many sectors. Attempts
are now being made to address these problems but there is some way to go.
2. THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE UK (1970-
2000)
As we have already noted, the dramatic ﬂuctuations in unemployment and inﬂa-
tion in Britain since 1970 have only the most tenuous relationship to technology,
so after a very brief overview of the main macroeconomic indicators, we focus on
GDP per capita and productivity.
2.1. Basic Macroeconomic Indicators
Since the 1960s, the UK economy has been on a bit of a roller-coaster ride. In
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 we report on unemployment, inﬂation and GDP growth.
During the 1960s unemployment and inﬂation were low and GDP growth was
high. Indeed GDP probably grew by more in the 1960s than in any other decade
in UK history. However, by the end of the 1960s unemployment and inﬂation
were both starting to rise and by the early 1970s they had both reached their
highest level since 1950. After the ﬁrst oil shock GDP growth fell and inﬂation
and unemployment rose to new heights. After Mrs Thatcher came to power in
41979, macroeconomic policy was signiﬁcantly tightened and with the onset of the
second oil shock, the UK had its worst recession since the 1930s. A slow recovery
followed but, assisted by macro policy relaxation in the latter half of the 1980s,
a big drop in commodity prices and ﬁnancial deregulation, this turned into a
dramatic boom. This was immediately followed by an equally dramatic slump as
monetary policy was tightened in response to rising inﬂation.. However since the
exit from the European Exchange Rate mechanism in 1992, monetary policy has
been placed on a sound footing (based on inﬂation targeting) and this has assisted
in creating a stable and rather benign state of aﬀairs which has lasted until the
present day. However, it is clear that the period from 1970 to 1995 was one of
great volatility relative to previous decades.
2.2. GDP per Capita, Productivity and Labour Input
In the mid-19th century, Britain was the richest country in the world. In Table
2.1 we present a brief summary of what has happened since. As a consequence of
their superior growth rates, ﬁr s tt h eU Sa n dt h e nG e r m a n yh a do v e r t a k e nt h eU K
by 1914. However two world wars and the economic upheavals of the Inter-War
years changed things somewhat, so that by 1950, both France and Germany3 were
over 30 percent below the UK in terms of GDP per capita and the US was nearly
70 percent above (see Table 2.2)4. Then, during the European Golden Age (1950-
73), the forces of convergence assisted by the Common Market (1959) enabled
Continental Europe to grow at an unprecedented rate, so that by 1973 France and
Germany had overtaken Britain which, in its turn, had caught up slightly with the
US. Until the early 1980s, the UK fell further behind its European competitors
but since then it has been catching up so that by 1996 GDP per capita in the UK
is fairly close to that of its European partners while still being well behind the
US. Finally, it is worth noting that there is no sign of any dramatic improvements
in growth rates in the late 1990s outside the United States.
3In the post-War period, Germany refers to West Germany.
4Note both France and (West) Germany has recovered from the Second World War by 1951
in the sense that GDP per capita was by then higher than in any pre-War year (see Crafts and
Toniolo, 1996, Table 1.2).
5Table 2.1
R a t e so fG r o w t ho fG D Pp e rC a p i t a( %p a )
1860-1914 1920-39 1951-73 1974-95 1995-99
UK 1.04 1.56 2.24 1.87 2.03
France 0.96 0.78 4.92 1.63 1.93
Germany 1.47 2.91 5.11 2.01 1.89
US 1.70 0.86 1.54 1.72 2.74
Source: Crafts and Toniolo (1996), Table 1.10; Eurostat and OECD Economic Outlook.
Table 2.2
GDP per Capita (UK=100)
1950 1973 1996
UK 100 100 100
France 69.7 110.2 105
Germany 63.3 104.7 113
US 167.4 151.6 137
Source: Bean and Crafts (1996), Table 6.2; O’Mahony (1999) Table 1.1.
In order to understand more clearly what has been happening in the Post-
War period, it is important to divide GDP per capita into GDP per hour worked
(productivity) and hours worked per capita (labour input). The reason for doing
so is that there have been dramatic changes in labour input in some countries
since 1973, which are shown in Table 2.3. The key feature is that while in 1973,
6Table 2.3
Employment/Population Ratio (Age 15-64)
1973 1979 1983 1990 1996 1999
UK 71.4 70.8 64.3 72.4 69.8 71.7
France 65.9 64.4 60.8 59.9 59.2 59.8
G e r m a n y 6 8 . 76 6 . 26 2 . 26 4 . 16 4 . 56 4 . 9
US 65.1 68.0 66.3 72.2 72.9 73.9
J a p a n 7 0 . 87 0 . 37 1 . 17 2 . 67 4 . 17 2 . 9
Annual Hours Worked Per Worker
UK 1929 1821 1719 1773 1732 1720
France 1904 1813 1711 1668 1644 1604
Germany 1868 1764 1733 1611 1668 1556
US 1924 1905 1882 1943 1951 1976
Japan 2201 2126 2095 2031 1955 1842
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (various issues).
7the labour input (hours × employment/population) was of the same order of mag-
nitude in all the countries except Japan, since that time it has fallen by over 20
percent in France and Germany, by over 10 percent in the UK whereas it has
risen by over 10 percent in the US. Bearing this in mind, we now look at pro-
ductivity growth rates in the Post-War period in Table 2.4. Here we see that
after 1973, growth rates in output per hour are considerably higher than those
for GDP per capita for the European countries, reﬂecting the decline in labour
input. Moving on to total factor productivity growth rates, the most notewor-
thy is the fact that in the UK there is hardly any decline after 1973, in contrast
to all the other countries which exhibit dramatic falls. This reﬂects the fact that
Table 2.4
Productivity Growth Rates (% pa)
Output per hour Total factor productivity
1950-73 1973-96 1950-73 1973-96
UK 2.99 2.22 1.74 1.65
France 4.62 2.78 3.10 1.62
Germany 5.18 2.56 3.76 1.67
US 2.34 0.77 1.49 0.38
Japan 6.11 3.06 3.57 1.33
Source: O’Mahony (1999), Tables 1.2 and 1.5.
the decline in labour productivity after 1973 was much lower in the UK than
elsewhere allied to the UK’s generally lower investment rates (see Table 3.4 in
the next section). The interesting question of why labour productivity growth
in the UK was so much higher relative to the other countries after 1973 than it
was before, despite the roller-coaster ride of the macro-economy, has been the
subject of much research (see, for example, Layard and Nickell, 1989; Nickell et
al., 1992; Bean and Crafts, 1996). Key factors include the transformation of
industrial relations, the dramatic decline of unions in the private sector and the
increase in product competition market following extensive privatisation, and the
introduction of the European Single Market.
The consequences of all these diﬀerences in growth rates lead to the picture in
1996 which is set out in Table 2.5. Once we control for the diﬀerences in labour
8input we see that the US, France and Germany are relatively close to each other
but there remains a signiﬁcant productivity gap between these countries and the
UK. If we focus on the market sector, in which output measures are more reliable,
there is a 30 percent labour productivity gap between the UK and Germany and
the US (see row 4). These gaps are, however, diﬀerent in nature. Once we control
for capital intensity and labour quality (in row 7), the gap between the UK and
Germany all but disappears. However, the gap between the UK and the US
remains at 16 percent. It is possible to “explain” this gap by including the stock
of R&D in this analysis, because the US has a substantially larger stock of R&D
per unit of output than the UK (see Crafts and O’Mahony, 2000, Table 5). The
remaining gap of 16 percent between the UK and the US would then simply be
down to lower levels of “innovation”. This is rather simplistic, however, since it
sheds no real light on the underlying process. This is what McKinsey (1998) sets
out to explain and concludes that the gap is fundamentally due to the low levels
of competitive intensity in the UK, the high level of product market regulation
Table 2.5
Levels of Productivity, 1996
UK France Germany US Japan
1. GDP per capita 100 105 113 137 113
2. GDP per person engaged 100 126 126 129 102
3. GDP per hour 100 132 129 121 90
4. Market output per hour 100 120 131 128 81
5. TFP (1995), whole
economy 100 118 109 112 77
6. TFP (1995), market
sector 100 108 115 119 76
7. TFP (1995), skills adjusted,
market sector 100 n/a 104 116 n/a
Source: O’Mahony (1999), Tables 1.1, 1.4 and 1.5.
9Table 2.6
Total Factor Productivity by Sector in the UK
Levels of TFP in US TFP Growth (% pa)








Textiles etc. 132 1.29




Distributive trade 135 0.43
Financial services 122 0.98
Personal services 135 1.21
Non-market services - 0.17
Total 112 1.65
Source: O’Mahony (1999), Tables 2.9, 2.13.
and the lack of exposure to best practice. Looking at it from the viewpoint of
technological innovation, the problem in the UK is the lack of eﬀective use of
technology in major sectors of the economy.
2.3. Productivity Growth in Diﬀerent Sectors
The trends outlined in section 2.2 can be broken down by sector. Table 2.6
shows that the productivity gap relative to the US is not fundamentally driven
by any particular sectors. Compared to the US, the UK’s position is generally
unfavourable. An exception is in agriculture were TFP was much higher in Britain
than in France, Germany or Japan. UK TFP is also relatively strong in the utilities
and construction compared to the other EU countries.
10Britain’s performance in manufacturing is generally worse than her relative po-
sition in the total market economy. However, even in the service sectors the UK
does not enjoy a TFP advantage. Britain’s TFP gap in ﬁnancial services is large
relative to Germany (41%), and her gap is large in personal services relative to the
US (35%). Looking over time, Britain’s relative decline in market services com-
pared to Germany owes much to the decline in her relatively favourable position
in services. Relative to the US, the productivity gap was closed proportionately
less in services than in manufacturing.5
High Tech Sectors
In policy debates there is often a focus on ‘strategic high tech’ sectors. The
OECD statistics classify these as the following: aircraft (ISIC 3845), oﬃce and
computing (ISIC 3825), drugs and medicines (3522), radio, TV & communication
equipment (3832).6 Across the OECD these industries are characterised by having
relatively high shares of skilled workers, high levels of productivity and high shares
of trade. They have also had much higher than average growth rates of skilled
workers, productivity and trade. Although the manufacturing sector as a whole
has declined, high tech sectors enjoy an increasingly large share of this sector at
the expense of low tech industries.
It is important to bear in mind that these sectors are small relative to the
economy as a whole. For example, even within manufacturing the high tech
sectors (including electricity machinery and instruments) employed only 20% of
UK workers in 1994 relative to 16% in 1970 (OECD, 1996). About a ﬁfth of
manufacturing workers were also employed in these high tech sectors in the rest
of the G5.
Looking at TFP growth by broad sector, manufacturing actually had slower
growth over 1973-95 than the utilities (electricity, gas and water), transport and
agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing. Within manufacturing, however, it is the case
that the relatively high tech chemical sector has enjoyed faster TFP growth than
the relatively low tech textiles and food sectors.
5Although the caveats regarding measurement problems in the service sectors should be born
in mind.
6For example, OECD (1999) Annex 1. The classiﬁcation is based on R&D performed and
R&D ‘acquired’ from other industries. Medium-high tech includes instruments, vehicles, elec-
trical machinery, chemicals, other transport and non-electrical machinery.
112.4. Summary
UK labour productivity is lower than the US, France and Germany. Most of
the productivity gap with France and Germany can be accounted for by diﬀerent
factor usage. Relative to Germany, for example, the UK invests less in physical
and human capital. Even accounting for this, there remains a substantial TFP
gap with the USA of the order of 16%. The UK made some improvement in
closing this gap, especially in the 1980s. For this reason, the OECD wide post-
1973 TFP slowdown appeared much less severe in the UK than in other countries.
This improvement, however, was not primarily driven by better performance in
the more technologically advanced parts of the economy. We now turn explicitly
to UK innovation performance.
3. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN THE UK (1970-
2000)
As we have seen, the relative productivity performance of the UK has improved
over the last two decades particularly given factor inputs. Over this period, TFP
growth has been among the highest in the G7. In this section, we focus on the
record of technological innovation in the UK over the same period. We start with
the performance of the science base and then work outwards.
3.1. The Output of the Science Base
The UK has a relatively strong position on indicators of the science base. With
only 1% of the world’s population the UK produces 8% of the world’s scientiﬁc
research papers (Table 3.1). The share of citations stands at 9%. This is ahead
of all other EU countries and Japan. Other indicators of elite science are also
strong. For example, in winning science prizes in excess of $200,000 the UK is
second only to the US and well ahead of third placed Germany.7
These ﬁgures need to be interpreted with care, however, as they may partially
reﬂect the fact that English is the dominant language of science. It is no surprise
that the US is ahead of the UK in these measures of the scientiﬁcb a s e ,b u tr a t h e r
more surprising that Canada (although not Australia) has a higher share than the
UK of scientiﬁc papers and citations.
7An often heard boast is that there are more scientiﬁc Nobel prizewinners in Trinity College,
Cambridge than in France.
12Not only is the UK strong in elite science it also produces a high proportion
of graduates in science and engineering. In 1995 the ﬂow of these graduates as
a proportion of total employment was higher than any other G7 country (see
OECD, 1999, Table 2.6.1). This is important in terms of stimulating technology
transfer. A large proportion of these graduates, however, end up working outside
the scientiﬁc sector, for example in ﬁnance or consultancy.
3.2. General Innovative Performance
3.2.1. R&D
Looking at the OECD as a whole, gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a pro-
portion of GDP rose substantially in the 1970s and 1980s, but stabilised or fell in
the 1990s (see Table 3.2). Much of the 1990s fall was due to government cutbacks
in R&D especially in countries where there was a high military spend on R&D as
a result of end of the Cold War. There has also been a general move away from
direct government subsidies to R&D (and a increase in ﬁscal subsidies such as tax
credits).8
Table 3.1







Source: UK Oﬃce of Science and Technology.
The UK stands out as having the lowest general R&D and business R&D
(BERD) intensity of the G5 countries. It is also one of the very few countries
to have cut its R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP since the early 1980s.
Furthermore, even if we focus on business performed R&D, stripping out R&D
8See Bloom et al. (2001). The USA, Canada, Australia and Spain have relatively generous
tax breaks for R&D compared to the UK and Germany. Britain introduced an R&D tax credit
for small ﬁrms in April 2000.
13performed in government labs, universities and elsewhere in the public sector,
Britain stands out as one of the only countries where business enterprise R&D fell
in the 1980s.
The falling relative R&D intensity in the UK since 1981 is not really explained
by change in the industry mix (such as the relatively fast rise of the low R&D
Table 3.2
Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as Percentage of GDP
1981 1985 1990 1995 1997
U K 2 . 42 . 22 . 22 . 01 . 9
France 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.2
Germany 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.3
U S 2 . 42 . 92 . 82 . 62 . 7
Japan 2.1 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.9
O E C D 2 . 02 . 32 . 42 . 22 . 2
Source: OECD (1999), Table 3.1.1.
14Table 3.3
R&D Expenditure and Funding
UK France Germany US
1981
GERD as a percentage of GDP 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.4
BERD as a percentage of GDP 1.5 1.1 1.7 1.7
Percentage of BERD ﬁnanced by industrya 70.0 75.4 83.1 68.4
Percentage of BERD ﬁnanced by government 30.0 24.6 16.9 31.6
Industry-ﬁnanced BERD as a percentage of GDP 1.1 0.8 1.4 1.2
1996
GERD as a percentage of GDP 1.9 2.3 2.3 2.6
BERD as a percentage of GDP 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.9
Percentage of BERD ﬁnanced by industrya 90.5 87.3b 91.0 83.6
Percentage of BERD ﬁnanced by government 9.5 12.7 9.0 16.4
Industry-ﬁnanced BERD as a percentage of GDP 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6
a Includes domestic and foreign industry, and also ‘other’ which is a very small category.
b Latest ﬁgures available for France is for 1995.
Notes: GERD - gross domestic expenditure on R&D, which covers all R&D carried
out on national territory and therefore includes government intramural expenditure on
R&D, expenditure by the higher education sector on R&D and BERD. BERD - business
enterprise expenditure on R&D.
Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD, 1998.
service sectors in the UK). It is mainly a ‘within industry’ phenomenon (see Van
Reenen, 1997)9. Interestingly, in the early 1970s, the UK general R&D intensity
was second only to the US level amongst G7 countries, and even in 1981 the
GERD/GDP ratio was 2.4%, similar to the US and Germany (see Table 3.2).
Part of the story is that the proportion of R&D performed by business but
funded by government has fallen more dramatically in the UK than in other coun-
tries. The share of BERD funded by the UK government fell by from 30% to 10%
between 1981 and 1996 (see Table 3.3). Industry funded BERD as a proportion
o fG D Ph a sb e e nb r o a d l ys t a b l ei nt h eU Ka n di nG e r m a n ya n dh a sr i s e ni nt h e
9A more recent decomposition analysis of business R&D intensity in manufacturing 1990-
1997 (OECD, 1999, p.143) also reveals that the 0.6 percent fall in UK intensity was all within
industry.
15USA and France (and most other OECD countries). This is a result of explicit
UK government policy to move away from funding ‘near market’ R&D.
Interestingly, of all the G7 countries only Canada has a higher proportion of
its R&D performed by smaller companies (under 500). It appears to be the larger
British ﬁrms who are failing to invest in R&D as much as other countries (see
OECD, 1999, Table 5.4.1).
3.2.2. Investment in tangible capital
As we noted in Section 2, investment in tangible capital is low compared to other
OECD countries (see Table 3.4 and Bond and Jenkinson, 1996). Disaggregating
the types of investment is instructive. The UK invests about 8.3% of GDP in plant
and equipment which is the OECD average. The poor position is mainly drive by
very low investment in public infrastructure and in residential construction.
16Table 3.4
Investment as a Percentage of GDP, 1960-95
UK France Germany US
Gross ﬁxed capital formation 17.9 22.2 22.3 18.3
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
excluding residential construction 14.2 15.5 15.7 13.6
Gross ﬁxed capital formation:
machinery and equipment 8.3 8.8 8.7 7.5
Source: OECD Historical Statistics, 1960-95, 1997 edition.
On the other hand, the UK has successfully attracted the largest volume of
foreign direct investment in the OECD. In 1997 inward investment was 2.8% of
GDP compared to an EU average of 1.4% and OECD average of 1.1% (see OECD,
1999, Table 6.1.3). This internationalisation of investment is equally true of R&D
-t h eU Kh a d1 5 %o fi t sR & Df u n d e df r o ma b r o a di n1 9 9 7 ,w h i c hw a st h eh i g h e s t
proportion in the OECD. Some of this position is simply due to ﬁnancial ﬂows -
outward investment is also exceptionally high. Part of the FDI numbers, however,
do reﬂect genuine new plant; but here the numbers are not so dramatic. The share
of foreign aﬃliates10 in manufacturing production, for example, is about equal to
that in France (30.5% in UK, 25.8% in France) although higher than Germany
(7.1%) or Italy (10.2%).
Overall investment in ‘knowledge’ (deﬁned by OECD to be the sum of R&D,
software and public spending on education) was 8.3% in 1995. The EU and OECD
average were 7.9% (US spent 8.4%, Germany 8.1% and France 10.2%).
3.2.3. Patents
R&D is only a measure of the inputs to the science base. What about the outputs?
The UK has a lower share of patents than other G5 countries (see OECD, 1999,
Table 11.2.1). Furthermore, this share has declined over time (whether one uses
US or EU patents) even if we exclude Japa nw h i c hh a sh a da ne n o r m o u si n c r e a s e
(see Table 3.5 for US patents). This is particularly disappointing given that the
10To be a foreign aﬃliate there has to be a greater than 50% holding in the establishment by
a parent company.
17UK’s R&D spend is concentrated in pharmaceuticals which have a relatively high
propensity to patent.
Table 3.5
US Patents Granted (1963-93)
Percentage of Total (G7) Percentage of Total
(G7 excluding Japan)
1963-79 1985 1993 1963-79 1985 1993
UK 4.2 3.5 2.3 4.5 4.3 3.0
France 2.8 3.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 3.9
Germany 7.2 9.4 7.0 7.6 11.4 9.1
US 71.2 55.2 54.1 75.4 67.2 70.0
Japan 5.6 17.8 22.7 -
Source: US Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, Patenting Trends in the United States, 1963-
93.
3.2.4. Innovation
EU innovation surveys (CIS) give an alternative measure of innovative output.
On this measure, UK manufacturing ﬁrms spent less of their turnover introducing
new products and processes than those in France and Germany (Table 3.6). This
appears mainly due to larger ﬁrms’ lower spend. The position is reversed, however,
in services.
The problem with the CIS is that the concept of innovation is somewhat vaguer
than R&D where the OECD Frascati deﬁnition is more precise. Furthermore,
whereas the response rates for the R&D surveys are close to 100% (they are
conﬁdential and compulsory in many countries) the CIS survey has a much lower
response rate. In the UK response rates were about 43%.11 Thus, one must be
careful in drawing any strong conclusions from the innovation survey.
18Table 3.6





Source: OECD (1999), Table 5.5.1.
3.2.5. Diﬀusion
The main productivity beneﬁts from innovation are only reaped as it becomes
spread around the economy. Measuring the spread of a new technology is no
easy task, however. Which technology do we choose to measure? Do we have
internationally comparable data examining the same technology? Is this measured
in a consistent way over time? Finally, the technological innovations may be
less important than the organisational innovations that may accompany the new
technology.12
-I C T s
Data sources are richest on ICTs (information and communication technolo-
gies). The UK seems to perform relatively well on these measures. Of the G7
countries the UK is second only to the US in ICT expenditure as a proportion of
GDP in 1997 (according to Table 3.7). Secure web servers for e-commerce stood
at 1.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in August 1998 which was higher than France, Ger-
many and Italy, but below Canada and the USA. 18% of the UK population were
regular internet users in 1998 compared to 37% in the US, 11% in Japan, 10%
in Germany and 11% in France (OECD, 1999). The UK has some advantages in
these areas because of a good IT infrastructure. Telecommunication prices are
relatively low compared to other EU countries, thanks to tough competition.
12See Bresnahan et al., 1998, for a study suggesting that the failure to introduce complemen-
tary organisational changes alongside computerisation harms productivity.
19Table 3.7
ICT Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1997
IT hardware IT services Telecom Total
and software
UK 1.5 3.4 2.7 7.6
France 0.9 3.3 2.2 6.4
Germany 0.9 2.4 2.3 5.6
US 1.7 3.4 2.7 7.8
Japan 1.1 2.7 3.6 7.4
OECD 1.3 2.8 2.8 6.9
Source: OECD (1999), Table 2.3.1.
- Other indicators
Vickery and Northcott (1995) review a number of national surveys of the diﬀu-
sion of advanced manufacturing technologies and microelectronics. The traditional
S-shaped diﬀusion curve is observed. The UK does appear to be a laggard in the
take up of these new technologies for both indicators (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2),
although it eventually catches up. This would be consistent with the notion that
poor workforce skills delay the introduction of new technologies.
The cross-national pattern in organisational innovations is less clear. Accord-
ing to Ruigrok et al. (1999) the picture mirrors that of technical diﬀusion. For
example, 10.2% (17.9%) of all European ﬁrms sampled has introduced “extensive
decentralisation of strategic decisions” in 1992 (1996). In the UK the ﬁgures stood
at only 8% and 13.6%. The most comprehensive is probably the EU’s 1996 EPOC
survey covering 33,000 European establishments (OECD, 1999b). On a number
of indicators the UK appears average or above average (teams-based work or-
ganisation, delayering of management, employee involvement).13 Of course, it is
controversial as to how innovative these organisational forms are, or how impor-
tant they are in stimulating productivity growth.
1333% of UK workplaces with at least 50 employees used team-based organisation compared
to 30% in France, 28% in Italy and 20% in Germany. Denmark was the highest at 40%.
203.3. Innovation Performance by Industry
3.3.1. Science Base
As we can see in Table 3.8, the UK Science Base is particularly specialised in the
medical-biological sector and is notably weak in chemistry, physics and engineer-
ing, exactly the opposite of Germany and Japan. In the US, the research eﬀort is
much more evenly spread with the notable exception of the weakness in chemistry.
Table 3.8
Specialization Proﬁles in Science, 1981-86
B a s e do nC i t a t i o n s
UK France Germany US Japan
Clinical Medicine 1.17 0.78 0.68 1.07 0.72
Bio-Medical 0.96 0.96 0.93 1.11 0.92
Biology 1.25 0.64 0.81 0.89 0.95
Chemistry 0.89 1.34 1.58 0.67 1.92
Physics 0.70 1.53 1.55 0.86 1.19
Earth and Space 0.93 0.87 0.71 1.19 0.33
Engineering/Technology 0.65 0.82 1.18 0.94 1.86
Mathematics 0.90 1.39 1.16 0.97 0.67
Source: CNR-ISRDS.
3.3.2. Industry Speciﬁcs
R&D intensity in manufacturing is lower than the G5 average in every industry
except the chemicals, metal products and pharmaceuticals industry (see Figure
3.3). UK R&D is particularly low in the lowest tech industries (textiles, paper and
wood products). The strength of pharmaceuticals is striking. About a quarter
of all UK business R&D is located in this sector, and UK R&D intensity is well
above average.
The UK has strongest biotech sector in Europe and is second only to the US
i nt h eO E C D .T h e r ea r em o r eb i o t e c hﬁrms in Britain than any other EU country.
Despite the set-backs over the backlash against GM foods, the drugs related sector
is forecast to have high worldwide growth. The strength of the sector rests in its
21close relation to the academic science base (clusters around universities such as
Cambridge) and the presence of sophisticated capital markets in the UK. These
may also have been factors behind the success of the pharmaceuticals industry.
In fact, corporate venture capital from the companies in this sector is another
advantage enjoyed by British biotech ﬁrms. The absence of a signiﬁcant manufac-
turing component is probably an advantage given UK weakness in intermediate
skills (see Section 4).
3.4. Some Notable UK Innovations
A picture seems to be emerging of a strong Science Base but weaknesses in trans-
lating scientiﬁc innovations into marketable and proﬁtable products. This picture
is worth illustrating with a few notable UK inventions.
The Computer. The 1500 valve, programmable Collosus computer was completed
in 1943 in Bletchley Park in order to decode communications between Hitler and
his generals encrypted using the Lorenz cipher. Built by Tommy Flowers based
on a design of Max Newman and Alan Turing, it operated successfully until the
end of the war after which it was destroyed, along with all the blueprints, on the
orders of the UK government and those who worked on it were forbidden to talk
about it!
The X-Ray Scanner. The most signiﬁcant advance in radiology since the discovery
of X-rays, it was invented by Geoﬀrey Houndsﬁeld at EMI. Houndsﬁeld won a
Nobel prize but EMI lost so much money in disastrous attempts to manufacture
and market the scanner that its medical electronics division ceased to exist.
The Structure of DNA. This discovery in 1953 by Crick and Watson at Cambridge
laid the foundation of the bio-technology industry. Like penicillin, it was not
patented.
Zantac. This anti-ulcer drug generated such gigantic proﬁts that it turned Glaxo
from a small player to the largest pharmaceutical company in the world (after
the merger with Smithkline/Beecham). Zantac was not even the ﬁrst in the ﬁeld,
which was Tagamet, but its world domination was essentially a marketing triumph.
The Proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. The most famous mathematical discovery
of the latter part of the 20th century. Of no known commercial value.
3.5. Summary
Britain has a relatively strong academic science base. Inventiveness and the posi-
tion of elite science continues to be impressive. The reasons for this are a complex
22mixture of culture, the fact that English is a global language and the ensemble of
institutions around the universities.
Britain has been weak at translating this science base into innovation and in-
dustrial performance. Some high tech industries, such as pharmaceuticals, closely
connected to the thriving bio-medical science base have also done well, but these
are the exceptions to the rule. Business R&D and patenting are low (and falling)
by international standards. Diﬀusion of innovations around the economy appears
to lag behind other countries, although this may be less true of the current wave
of ICTs than in the past.
There remains, however, an apparent contradiction. As we have seen, since
the early 1970s, Britain’s innovation performance in terms of R&D and patents
has weakened relative to that of its main competitors. And yet, TFP growth
has risen relative to these same competitors over the same period. So what is
the explanation. Basically, we would argue that the good performance of TFP
reﬂects catch-up, the process being driven by the factors discussed in Section 2.2.
Nevertheless, there remains a TFP gap (see Tables 2.5, 2.6) and the fundamental
reasons underlying this have already been discussed at the end of Section 2.2. But
one of the more immediate factors relates to the picture of technological innovation
which we have drawn, namely strong basic science but weak commercial follow-up.
This reﬂects a weakness in the ability of the commercial sector to absorb basic
innovations, with this weakness being directly related to low levels of R&D. For it
is known that R&D investments help ﬁrms absorb innovations (see Griﬃth et al.,
1999, for strong evidence) including the output of basic science. To pursue this,
and related issues, further, we turn next to the overall environment within which
UK ﬁrms operate.
4. THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH FIRMS OPERATE
As we have seen, the level of technological innovation in UK companies is com-
paratively low and this is one of the factors behind the TFP gap between the UK
and its main competitors. In order to see why this is so, we look at a number
of features of the environment within which UK ﬁrms operate. So, in turn, we
consider the capital market, the labour market, education, macroeconomic policy,
industry structure, property rights, openness to trade and government policies
more generally.
234.1. The Capital Market
Overall, these are deep and liquid being very well integrated into global markets
with London being one of the top three ﬁnancial centres in the world. Two par-
ticular aspects of the capital market are particularly important for innovation,
namely equity markets and the venture capital sector. We look at these in turn.
4.1.1. The equity market
This is again very liquid and is dominated by institutional investors. It is driven
by shareholder value and it is structured so that mergers and acquisitions are rel-
atively easy to undertake. So there is a very active market for corporate control
with “deal-making” being one of the main activities of corporate chief executives.
To provide a picture of this, we present a analysis of public takeovers in Table
4.1 which reveals that the proportion of hostile takeovers in the UK is massively
higher than elsewhere. What are the consequences of this? First, there is a direct
consequence. Managers have a very strong incentive to avoid a hostile takeover
because, in 90 percent of cases, the top management of the target company is
replaced within two years (Franks and Mayer, 1992). What, then, do managers
do when under threat of takeover. Basically they institute changes to improve
total factor productivity and they reduce investment expenditure, particularly if
the threat is hostile (see Nuttall, 1998 and Bond et al., 1998). This latter re-
sult might, at ﬁrst sight, be interpreted as supporting a short-termist view of
takeovers. However, when combined with the result on TFP, it might equally
support a disciplinary view of takeovers where the hostile threat reduces manage-
rialist overinvestment.
Table 4.1
Number of Public Takeovers (1990-94)
Non-Hostile Hostile Total Percent Hostile
UK 285 68 353 18
France 492 4 496 1
Germany 51 2 53 4
US 831 27 858 3
Source: AMDATA; McKinsey Analysis in CBI (1996), Exhibit 23.
24Despite this argument, there is no question that many commentators in Britain
think that pressure from the equity market induces managers to behave in a short-
termist fashion and that this explains the weakness of the R&D performance of UK
ﬁrms. Thus in 1986, Nigel Lawson, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, remarked
“The big institutional investors nowadays increasingly react to short-term pres-
sure on investment performance ... they are unwilling to countenance long-term
investment or suﬃcient expenditure on R&D.” However, hard evidence in favour
of this view is in short supply. R&D or capital expenditure announcements tend
to raise stock prices (see, for example, McConnell and Muscarella, 1985) and the
apparently decisive econometric results in Miles (1993) are undermined by his less
than convincing modelling of the risk premium. What about measures of the cost
of capital? Major international studies of the cost of capital include McCauley and
Zimmer (1989) and Coopers and Lybrand (1993) and some results are reported
in Table 4.2. Taking the numbers at face value certainly indicates that the cost of
capital in the UK tends to be on the high side for ﬁxed capital compared to other
European countries. This is partly a result of the high weight of equity relative
to debt in UK investment funding. Table 4.2 also has some information on R&D
user costs. Again, the UK is on the high side (although not out of line from France
or Germany) because until recently there were no major tax breaks for R&D. It is
noticeable that since 1979 there has been a general trend towards a more generous
treatment of R&D that was not matched in the UK until the introduction of the
R&D tax credit for small ﬁrms in 2000 and its proposed extension to laregr ﬁrms.
25Table 4.2
After Tax Cost of Capital (%)
McCauley and Zimmer Coopers and Lybrand Bloom et al (2001)
Plant/machinery All investment tax component of the
(20yr life) user cost of R&D
1988 1991 1997 1979
UK 9.2 19.9 38.2 38.0
Germany 7.0 17.5 38.5 39.1
US 11.2 15.1 30.3 38.0





Source: Coopers and Lybrand (1993), McCauley and Zimmer (1989), Table 2.Bloom et
al (2001) Table A2
A ﬁnal piece of evidence concerning the supply of capital to UK ﬁr m si st h e
fact that the sensitivity of ﬁrm-level investment to cash ﬂow is stronger in the UK
than in Continental European countries (e.g. Bond et al., 1997; Bond, Harhoﬀ
and Van Reenen, 1999). This fact could be interpreted as evidence of more severe
ﬁnancial constraints in Britain than elsewhere. There are alternative explanations,
however. For example, current cash ﬂo wm a yb es i m p l yap r o x yf o rb e t t e rf u t u r e
demand opportunities and the greater sensitivity of UK ﬁrms an indication of
their ﬂexibility rather than their inability to ﬁnance projects.
Overall, UK managers are under considerable pressure from the stockmarket
and they do appear to face somewhat higher levels of the cost of capital than their
foreign counterparts. However, there is no strong evidence that this is a signiﬁcant
factor in explaining low levels of R&D expenditure.
4.1.2. Venture capital
The UK has a strong venture capital sector, the largest in the EU. However, very
little UK venture capital goes into early-stage companies (17 percent as opposed
26to nearly 30 percent in Germany and the US). Survey evidence shows that 20
percent of UK companies reported delay, cancellation or prevention of innovation
projects. Of these, sources and cost of ﬁnance was an important factor in around
half the cases (around twice the EU average). High tech businesses were more
likely to encounter ﬁnancial constraints. So there is some evidence of a “ﬁnance
gap” for new high tech projects, although this may currently seem hard to believe,
in the light of the number of new dot.com companies which have been able to raise
equity capital at minimal cost.
4.2. The Labour Market
4.2.1. General issues
The UK labour market is, and always has been, relatively lightly regulated. The
major change since the 1970s has been the progressive disappearance of trade
unions from the private sector, where union density is currently below 20 per-
cent, having been above 50 percent in 1979. Furthermore, trade unions are now
generally cooperative with regard to innovation whereas in the 1970s they were
frequently hostile. Indeed, overall, trade unions are far less adversarial than they
were in the 1970s as evidenced by a dramatic decline in industrial disputes. The
reasons underlying this include anti-union legislation in the 1980s, increased prod-
uct market competition and changes in industrial structure. Since the early 1980s,
there is no reason to believe that the labour market has been an important factor
in explaining the poor innovation performance of the UK market sector.
4.2.2. The managerial labour market
The key feature of the labour market for the brightest and the best in the UK
was dramatically expressed by Sir John Harvey-Jones, former chairman of ICI
(at that time the largest manufacturing company in Britain) on a BBC Radio
4 programme on the City (Jan. 5, 1995), “When I was chairman of ICI all the
advisers that we used, advisers mark you, were all paid more than I was, be they
the auditors, be they the merchant banks, be they the City solicitors. Now I ask
you, in realistic national terms, who is likely to have the biggest impact on the
fate of the bloody country?” (Reported in Owen, 1999, chapter 9).
Thus the starting salary (growth rate over ﬁrst 5 years) for 1995 UK graduates
was 23K (5.5) in merchant banking, 20K (7.0) in IT consulting, 17.5K (8.2) in
27accountancy and 14.5K (2.0) in blue-chip engineering.14 One of the consequences
o ft h i ss t r u c t u r ei st h a tU Km a n a g e m e n ti sn o t ,o na v e r a g e ,u pt ot h eq u a l i t yo f
that of its main competitors. Thus, for example, in a comparison of domestically
owned UK plants with US owned UK plants in comparable sectors, the US owned
plants have a 32 percent value-added advantage. Of this 32 percent, 18 percent
is down to extra capital and higher quality labour and the remaining 14 percent
is down to better management (see study by National Institute of Social and
Economic Research, June 1998). The managers in US plants are more likely to
have been trained in a “best-practice” environment.
4.3. Education
The UK education system works very well for the top 30 percent of the ability
range and this is reﬂected in the performance of the Science Base. However, it
is weak in both the mid-range of abilities and at the bottom end. Considering
the latter ﬁrst, the International Adult Literacy Survey (1994-5) shows that 23
percent of the UK labour force is at the lowest level in quantitative literacy (e.g.
unable to check their change in a shop) compared with 21 percent in the US and
7 percent in Germany. In the mid-range, relative to both Germany and the US,
there is a distinct weakness in post-16 education in Britain for those who are not
going on to degree level (see Steedman, 1999).
The upshot of this implies that science, engineering and quantitative disciplines
produce high qualiﬁed manpower at a rate comparable to other OECD countries.
There are, however, distinct shortages at the technician and craft level. Further-
more, because of the structure of demand, the long-term prospects of those highly
qualiﬁed in science and engineering are far better in ﬁnance and consultancy than
in industry. Thus, for example, in a survey of 1980 UK graduates, by 1987 those
who worked in science and engineering tended to be rather badly paid whereas
those with science and engineering degrees were, on average, rather well paid. The
diﬀerence was due to those scientists and engineers who migrated to the ﬁnancial
sector.
4.4. Industry Structure
Concerning the basic industrial structure, a key feature is the very rapid decline
o ft h ep r o p o r t i o no fe m p l o y m e n ti ni n d u s t r ya n dt h ee q u a l l yr a p i dr i s ei ns e r v i c e s
14IDS Management Pay Review: Pay and Progression for Graduates 1995/96.
28since 1973. As we can see in Table 4.3, this change has been far quicker than
elsewhere. More speciﬁc and perhaps relevant features of the UK product market
environment are the following. First, Britain has had a relatively weak competi-
tion policy over the post-war period. This has allowed low levels of competition to
exist in many sectors, a situation exacerbated by a desire to create national cham-
pions. Second, privatisation and the consequent regulatory framework introduced
in the 1980s has led to some increase in competitive intensity.
29Table 4.3
Per Cent of Total Employment
Industry Services
1973 1994 1973 1994
UK 43 26 55 72
France 40 27 49 68
G e r m a n y 4 73 8 4 55 9
US 33 24 63 73
OECD 37 28 52 64
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1996, Table D. (The missing sector is Agricul-
ture.)
Third, the fact, as we have seen, that one of the main methods by which ﬁrms
grow is via mergers and acquisitions15 imposes substantial real resource costs as
well as weakening competition in many cases. Overall, the low level of product
market competition in the UK has probably been detrimental to TFP growth and,
more speciﬁcally, to innovation (see Geroski, 1990 and Nickell, 1996).
4.5. Openness
The UK has a low level of trade barriers although its membership of the EU
m e a n st h a ti ts u ﬀers from EU-wide trade barriers which have adversely aﬀected
both UK agriculture and the automobile sector by reducing competitive pressures.
It is worth noting that recent research indicates an important relationship between
trade openness and the rate of cross-country sectoral productivity convergence.
Furthermore, R&D intensity and human capital also speed up convergence by
raising the rate at which imported technology is absorbed (see Proudman and
Redding, 1998, and Griﬃth et al., 1999).
15Amazingly enough, UK companies spent more on foreign mergers and acquisitions than US
companies in 1998 (around $128 billion as opposed to $123 billion) (see OECD, 1999, Table
8.2). Of course, the quantity of foreign assets available to US companies is much less than that
available to UK companies. Indeed more US assets were purchased by non-US companies than
were purchased in the remainder of the G7.
304.6. Macroeconomic Policy
From the ﬁrst oil shock in 1974 until Britain’s ejection from the European Mon-
etary System in 1992, it is safe to say that macroeconomic policy in Britain was
not a great stabilising force.16 Over this period, British ﬁrms faced more volatility
than at any time since the 1930s. However, since 1992, with the onset of inﬂation
targeting, the economy has been increasingly stable. However, whether this has
impacted on productivity performance, which improved strongly in relative terms
in the early 1980s, is a moot point.
4.7. Government Policies
Some recent policy changes and non-changes are relevant to some of the above.
In summary we have
a) A strong current emphasis on basic education in order to improve literacy
and numeracy. Intermediate vocational education remains weak although
reforms are promised.
b) A new Competition Act came into force on the 1st March, 1998 and this
promises to be much tougher on anti-competitive practices than has been
the case hitherto. This should help to raise levels of competition in the UK.
c) The regulatory regimes in the utilities, telecom/IT and the ﬁnancial sec-
tor are generally well thought out and tend to be focused on encouraging
competition. However, there have been some notable exceptions such as the
recent problems with British Telecom in unbundling the local loop.
d) Labour market regulations currently strike a reasonable balance between
employer and employee although the act of complying with some of the
increasingly complex rules (e.g. the EU working time directive) imposes
substantial real resource costs per employee particularly on small ﬁrms.
16This is not a particular criticism of British policy-makers. The same situation applied in
most countries, in part because of the size of the shocks and in part because of the lack of
experience in dealing with large supply shocks. Here, Britain was notably badly placed because
in 1973 it had been persuaded, by Milton Friedman, among others, that the best way to deal
with shocks was to index wages. While this is ﬁne for nominal demand shocks, for large imported
commodity price shocks it is, of course, disastrous because to return to equilibrium, the real
consumption wage must fall.
31e) Planning and building regulations are overbearing and tend to be insensitive
to economic costs and beneﬁts.
f) Broadly the policy has generally been opposed to wide-ranging tax breaks
in favour of innovation although an R&D tax break has, in fact, just been
introduced for small ﬁrms (April 2000). Indeed current policy is moving
towards special help for SMEs, the rationale being that they face ﬁnancial
constraints particularly in the high tech sector. However, there is a danger
here of ineﬀectual tinkering with complicated measures which cost little, and
probably have correspondingly small eﬀects
4.8. Two Examples
To illustrate the implications of some of these features of the environment in
which UK ﬁrms operate, we present two mini-industry studies. The ﬁrst deals
with the highly successful UK pharmaceutical sector (Box 1), the second looks at
the distinctly less successful UK automobile industry (Box 2).
32Box 1
The UK Pharmaceutical Industry
The pharmaceutical industry is a UK success story. Despite having only 3% of
the world’s market, almost 10% of world R&D in this sector is located in the UK.
T h eR & Dt ov a l u ea d d e dr a t i o( i n1 9 9 7 ) was higher in the UK than any other
G7 country. In 1998 22% of all UK business R&D was performed by the drugs
industry, a higher share than any of the other 14 major OECD countries. Not
only is the level of R&D high, so is its productivity. For example, the ratio of
ﬁrst patent ﬁlings of new molecular entities (NMEs) to R&D is higher in the UK
than any other major OECD country. The industry has been dominated by three
players: Glaxo-Wellcome, Smithkline-Beecham and Astra-Zeneca. A remarkable
number of the world’s best selling drugs have come from British laboratories:
Tenormin (ICI), Tagamet (Smithkline), Zantac (Glaxo), Zoviraz (Wellcome) and
most recently Viagra (Pﬁzer’s R&D lab in Sandwich, Kent).
What are the reasons for success in this ﬁeld, but not in other science based
sectors such as computers and semi-conductors? There are basically four factors
to consider: regulation, foreign investment, the academic base and an “absence
of negatives”. Historically, many writers have pointed to the UK’s regulatory
system as an enabling factor. There are two aspects to this - price and quality
regulation. The PPRS (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme)17 allows ﬁrms
to launch at prices of their own choosing subject to a rate of return cap (with
generous allowances for R&D spend). The advantages of the PPRS have been in
its stability - its precursor was introduced in 1957 - and its voluntary nature.
The UK drug licensing authority was one of the ﬁrst (1967) requiring drugs
to pass an eﬃcacy test as well as a safety test. Regulatory approval is faster
than most other European countries. This combination of fast access to market
for highly eﬀective drugs and a reasonable rate of return meant UK companies
focused their eﬀorts on developing world-class drugs (Thomas (1994)). The sys-
tems in France, Italy and Japan rewarded ﬁrms who develop “me too” drugs sold
on the local market and penalise more innovative ﬁrms with low reimbursement
prices and unstable regulation. It is noticeable that countries that have more
ﬂexible price controls and tougher quality regulation (USA, UK, Switzerland and
Germany) also tend to also have a stronger pharmaceutical industry.18
17See Bloom and Van Reenen (1998) for a more extended discussion.
18Of course the causality may be reversed. Lobbying by strong indigenous drugs companies
could result in more favourable regulations.
33A second argument (Owen, 1999) stresses the importance of foreign direct in-
v e s t m e n t( m a i n l yb yU Sa n dS w i s sﬁrms) in the 1940s and 1950s. This exposed
British companies to competition from innovative world leaders.19 By contrast
many other industries were protected in the 1950s and 1960s by high tariﬀso r
procurement policies. The National Health Service (founded in 1948) provided
stable and high demand, support for clinical trials and unlike many European
systems did not discriminate between national and international suppliers. Fortu-
nately, there was no attempt to create “national champions” in pharmaceuticals.
All these arguments may explain historically why the British industry has
grown strong, but inertia apart, they can no longer be the main reason why the
industry continues to be an important R&D base. There are no strong reasons
why drug discovery, clinical trials or even manufacturing (within the EU) need to
be located in markets where regulation is better or the market is larger.
A more compelling explanation of why Britain remains a popular location for
R&D is the strong tradition of bio-medical research (see Table 3.8). Scientiﬁc
labour is less mobile than capital, so the proximity to research centres enables
companies to capture both skilled labour and new ideas. This is particularly
important for world class scientists, but also for the steady ﬂow of pharmacology
graduates. The strong academic science base would also explain why foreign ﬁrms
locate their R&D labs in the UK.
The UK also has more biotechnology ﬁrms than any other EU country. This
industry is reliant on a strong academic science base in bio-medicine - for example,
the cluster around Cambridge. The presence of sophisticated capital markets and
corporate venturing by the larger pharmaceutical ﬁrms are also factors in success.
Finally, the industry has been largely free of the negatives aﬀecting other
British industries. The manufacturing aspect is minor compared to the R&D and
marketing aspects. Thus the UK’s traditional weakness in manufacturing due to
poor intermediate skills, labour relations troubles and delayed entry into the EU20
were relatively unimportant.
19This was hardly welcomed by the locals. The CEO of Glaxo, Sir Harry Jephcott, concluded
a 1957 study with the grim warning “having regard to the weight of certain US companies in men
and money it is only a matter of time before the British ﬁrms were swamped out of existence
...” (Owen, p.371).
20The European market is far more fragmented in pharmaceuticals due to diﬀerent national
regulations.
34Box 2: The UK Automobile Industry
A brief post-war history. In the 1950s, the UK car industry was booming. Output
rose from 523 thousand units in 1950 to 1353 thousand units in 1960 and had risen
to close on 2 million by the mid 1960s (Owen, 1999, Chapter 9). This level was
maintained until the early 1970s, then halved over the next decade. From the mid
1980s there has been a signiﬁcant recovery.
In the 1950s, the UK industry was dominated by three domestically owned
companies, BMC, Rootes and Standard, and two American owned companies,
Ford and Vauxhall (GM). By the end of the 1960s, there was one domestically
owned company, British Leyland (BL), the “national champion”. At the present
time (2000), the national champion (Rover) has all but disappeared but three
Japanese manufacturers (Nissan, Honda, Toyota) are major players, and Ford
and Vauxhall remain strong. So we have a post-war history of two phases, a
signiﬁcant decline from the 1960s to the 1980s followed by a strong recovery.
Why the decline?
i) Britain’s failure to join the European Common Market in 1958. So from
1958 to 1972, when Britain joined, the UK car industry faced substantial
barriers to trade in what was then the fastest growing and most competitive
mass car market in the world.
ii) The creation and subsequent mismanagement of British Leyland. More or
less all the non-foreign owned UK car ﬁrms were merged in 1968, essentially
because the then Labour government believed that the way to strengthen
British industry was to create “national champions”. This turned out to
be a disaster, reducing domestic competition while creating a disparate and
ramshackle entity which was, apparently, impossible to manage.
iii) Finally, the whole of the UK car industry, foreign and domestically owned,
was beset by very poor labour relations.
The upshot of these factors was that by 1980, the UK car industry produced less
than one third of the cars produced in either France or Germany. The engineering
skills were there and brilliant cars like the Mini, the Land-Rover and the Jaguar
E-type were designed, produced and sold in large numbers. But the techniques,
management skills and eﬀort required to compete successfully in the high volume
35sector of the market were missing, partly because of the absence of strong enough
incentives. So, given this dire situation, why did things get better?
Why the recovery? By the late 1970s, it had become clear to car makers around
the world that the Japanese had invented a system for designing and making cars
which was vastly more eﬀective than any used elsewhere. When Bill Hayden,
head of manufacturing in Ford of Europe, went to Japan in 1978, he remarked
subsequently that he could not believe the magnitude of the productivity gap
(Owen, 1999, Ch.9, p.246). The methods used by the Japanese manufacturers
became widely known within a short space of time and every car manufacturer in
the world now uses them in some degree.
As a consequence, the British car industry beneﬁted greatly from the fact
that Nissan, Toyota and Honda all built car plants in Britain in the 1980s. This
Japanese invasion had a substantial positive impact both on the other foreign
owned car producers and on the supplying industries. For example, in 1992 the
average rejection rate of parts from Nissan’s UK supplier base was 1,180 per
million. By 1995 it was down to 190 per million (see McKinsey, 1998). The
introduction of eﬃcient new plants in the UK and the consequent spill-over eﬀects
has meant that car production is now getting close to its 1960s peak.
Yet the impact of the new Japanese car plants (which produce around one
quarter of UK cars) should not be overstated. On average, these Japanese trans-
plants in the UK remain around twice as productive as the remaining plants. So
why do the latter not simply adopt global (Japanese) best practice methods? It is
not because of any lack of high-tech automotive engineering skills in the UK. For
example, nearly all Formula 1 racing cars are made in Britain and most racing
teams are based there. In fact, the basic problem is that the non-Japanese plants
do not have a big enough incentive to undertake what is a complex and time
consuming activity (switching to best practice). Voluntary trade restrictions limit
Japanese manufacturers’ share of UK (and other big European) export markets.
These restrictions encourage Japanese manufacturers to maintain their prices in
line with domestic producers rather than using their productivity advantage to
cut prices and increase market share. This has obviously weakened the compet-
itive pressure on non-Japanese domestic producers, resulting in persistently low
productivity, with the high price umbrella enabling the relatively unproductive
plants to continue operating as they are. This situation contrasts with that in the
US, where domestic car manufacturers have been subject to unrestrained Japanese
competition and have, as a consequence, improved their productivity performance
by substantially more than their UK counterparts.
36The overall picture. The UK car industry presents a typical example of some
widespread problems in the UK economy. The fact that Britain dominates the
world in the construction of specialised racing cars shows its excellence at high-
tech automotive engineering. But this excellence does not translate into the ability
to use best practice in mass vehicle manufacture even when examples of such best
practice are just around the corner. One of the reasons is that for a substantial
part of the post war period, the UK car industry has not been subject to the
full blast of international competition - in the 1960s because Britain was outside
the European Common Market, in the 1980s and 1990s because of Japanese quo-
tas. Furthermore, domestic competition was deliberately emasculated by the mis-
guided desire to create a national chamption. This lack of competition severely
restricted the incentives for the domestic companies to go through the diﬃcult
process of adopting best practice techniques.
5. THE FINAL PICTURE
Over the period from 1970, Britain has improved its relative productivity perfor-
mance, but there remains a signiﬁcant market sector productivity gap between
Britain and both Continental Europe and the United States. Much of the gap be-
tween Britain and Continental Europe is down to lower levels of capital intensity
and skill. However, between Britain and the US, there remains a signiﬁcant gap
even if these are taken into account. These gaps cover all sectors and reﬂect not
just a weakness in high tech areas but an inability to absorb best-practice technol-
ogy and methods into wide swathes of the market sector. Underlying causes here
i n c l u d el o wl e v e l so fp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o n ,h i g hl e v e l so fp r o d u c tm a r k e t
regulation and general lack of exposure to best-practice methods and technology.
Part of this story is a weakness in technological innovation despite a high qual-
ity science base. This includes comparatively low and falling levels of R&D and
patenting as well as a distinct lag in the diﬀusion of innovations. Speciﬁc factors
underlying this weakness in the commercial application of technology innovations
include the following.
(i) There is some evidence that ﬁnancing constraints are important despite a
thriving venture capital sector. Many also consider short-termism to be a
signiﬁcant factor but there is little hard evidence to support this commonly
held view.
37(ii) While the education system is excellent for those at the upper end of the
ability range, the structure in place for post-school vocational education is
weak and this leads to a noticeable shortfall in technician skills which holds
back the absorption of innovations.
(iii) General management skills are not as highly valued as skills in ﬁnance, ac-
counting and consultancy in the UK labour market, so the brightest gradu-
ates (science or arts) tend to go into the latter areas. Furthermore, because
a large proportion of UK companies are not operating at the frontier of
best-practice, the majority of managers learn the job in a non-best-practice
environment. This, of itself, inhibits the generation and absorption of inno-
vations.
(iv) Until the early 1980s, the rising power of trade unions and their adversarial
nature sometimes militated against innovation. This problem no longer
applies.
(v) Underlying the above has been an overall weakness in competitive inten-
sity in the UK economy in many sectors. This weakness is gradually be-
ing eroded with deregulation in various product markets, privatisation and
strengthened legislation against anti-competitive practices. In some sectors,
h o w e v e r ,t h e r ei sag o o dw a yt og o .
(vi) Finally, in recent years, the macroeconomy has been far more stable than
of late and the structure of both monetary and ﬁscal policy is geared to
maintaining this stability. This should help the overall investment climate
for ﬁrms.
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